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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY

THE USED CAR DEALER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING
FROM THE SALE OF DEFECTIVE AUTOMOBILES
Although the cases are not numerous, those reported indicate a trend
in the establishment of a responsibility resting on the used car dealer for
injuries resulting from the sale of defective automobiles. While an automobile is not per se a dangerous instrumentality,' if defective or lacking in
the necessary safety equipment, it is imminently dangerous, 2 not only to
its passengers but also to those who might come in contact with it. Accidents
caused by the operation of defective automobiles have necessitated, among
other things, the passage of laws on financial responsibility. Although
generally the liability for injuries resulting from such accidents is borne by
the owner or his insurer, under certain circumstances the dealer of used cars
is also found in a position of responsibility. When a defective automobile
is sold and the defect is the cause of an accident with resultant injury to
either the purchaser or a person not a party to the sale, the dealer may find
himself legally liable.
While the used car dealer is not an insurer of the vehicle he sells,' the
courts have imposed upon him a duty to those who might come in contact
with it, whether driver, 5 passenger,6 or the person7 or property s of others.
He is charged with the duty of using reasonable care in detecting those
defects which would make the automobile unsafe, and knowledge of their
existence is imputed to him." In satisfying his duty be is not required to
disassemble the entire machine.' 0 He has only to ascertain whether the
vehicle is "equipped with the minimum essentials for safe operation."" His
responsibility would seem to fall between that of the new car dealer and the
manufacturer. While he cannot rely upon the care used by the manufacturer
as can the new car dealer,12 (in fact he cannot even rely on the care used
by independent contractors who work on reconditioning the car)", neither
1. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v.Leaverton, 239 Mo. App. 284, 288, 192 S.W.2d
681, 683 (1946); Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 201, 22 S.W.2d
226, 227 (1929); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wisc. 196, 218 N.W. 855, 859

(1928).

2. Barni v. Kutner, 76 A.2d 801, 805 (Del. 1950); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.,
supra note 1.
3. See Comment, 4 MIASIW L. Q. 502 (1950).
4. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1939); Curby v.
Masterbrook, 288 Mich. 676, 286 N.W. 123, 126 (1939).
5. Barni v. Kutner, supra note 2; Boos v. Claude, 69 S.D. 254, 9 N.W.2d 262 (1943).
6. Holt v. Eastern Motor Co., 65 Ga. App. 502, 15 S.E.2d 895 (1941); Bock v.
Truck and Tractor Inc., 18 Wash.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943).
7. Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra note 1.
8. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Leaverton, sujra note 1.
9. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra note 4.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 376.
12. Shroder v.Barron-Dady Motor Co., 111 S.W.2d 66 (Mo.1937); Morressy v.
Mazzio, 249 App. Div. 788, 292 N.Y. Supp. 455 (2d Dep't 1936).
13. MecGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., 131 Conn. 417, 40 A.2d 269 (1944) (tires
replaced by independent tire company before sale by dealer; wheel fell off after sale).
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need he examine every part as must a manufacturer. 14 When reduced to
individual cases and particular defects the reasonableness of the imposition
of such a duty is apparent. While this would seem to define and thus limit
his duty, in fact, just how far need he go in determining the safe condition
of his stock in trade?
The dealer is not required to furnish additional safety equipment that
is not standard on the model when sold new.' When the defect is one
known to him, he is in a position to escape liability if he will inform the
purchaser of it.' However, this does not hold true if the dealer knows or
has reason to believe that the car will not be made reasonably safe before
being operated, 17 in which case his negligence would be comparable to turning a car over to a person known to be unfit to drive it.' 8 As it is hardly
likely that the average dealer will advertise or represent his stock as being
defective and unsafe, this method of avoiding liability is seldom employed.
The majority of accidents involving defective used cars results from
two causes: inability to stop'0 and inability to steer.20 The more serious and
thus more hotly contested actions are based on accidents caused by these
defects. While patent and discoverable, 2' they require a more thorough
examination and testing to discover than those which are more obvious, such
as faulty tires, 22 broken springs, 23 escaping gas fumes 2 4 and loose wheels .2
Although the reported cases do not discuss the matter, a cursory examination will reveal that the time between sale and accident is an important
factor in connecting the dealer with the accident. As the defect must be
one of which the dealer has knowledge or of which he is charged with knowledge, 26 in order to hold him responsible it should manifest itself shortly
after the sale is made. 27 Otherwise it would appear that the defect was
14. See note 10 supra. But see Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra note I at 200,
218 N.W. 855, 860, where a second hand car dealer's duty is said to be the same as
that of a manufacturer.
15. Wilson, Jurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co., Interveners v. National
Casualty Co., 191 So. 574 (La. 1939).
16. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Lewis Auto Sales, 306 Ill. App. 132, 28 N.E.2d 300

(1940); Bergstresser v. Van loy, 142 Kan. 88, 45 P.2d 855 (1935);
§ 388 (1938).
17. Bergstresser v. Van Iloy, supra note 16 at 92, 45 P.2d at 857;
TORTS § 389 (1938).

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS

RESrATEDEfNT,

18. Bergstresser v. Van Iloy, supra note 16 at 92, 45 P.2d at 857.
19. Barni v. Kutner, upra note 2, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Leaverton, supra
note 1; Boos v. Claude, supra note 5; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra note 1.
20. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruncr, SU T note 4; Supera v. Mooreland States Corp.,
13 Cal. App.2d 186, 56 P.2d 595 (1936); lolt v. Eastern Motor Co., supra note 6;
Wells v. Oldsmobile Co. of Oregon, 147 Ore. 687, 35 P.2d 232 (1934).
21. See cases cited in notes 19 and 20 suPra.
22. McLeod v. Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N.W. 479 (1940).
23. Bock v. Truck and Tractor Inc., supra note 6.
24. Banker v. Packard Motor Car Co. of Chicago, 297 I11.App. 645, 17 N.E.2d
987 (1938).
25. McGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., supra note 13.
26. See note 9 supra.
27. See Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra note 4 (one day); Bami v. Kutner,
supra note 1 (two hours); McGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., supra note 13 (three days);
Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra note 1 (three blocks from garage). But see Bock v.
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either latent when the sale was made or that it developed subsequent thereto.
This is only reasonable since the dealer is not an insurer 8 and the owner
is under a duty to maintain his automobile in a safe condition. 29
Recovery is generally sought under one of two theories: negligence or
warranty. 0 The action under the theory of negligence is open to both the
purchaser and persons not parties to the sale, lack of privity of contract
being no defense to an action by a third person.3 1 While the intervening
negligence of the purchaser may be used as a defense by the dealer to an
action by the purchaser,32 it is not available when the plaintiff is a third
person .8
Whether the automobile is being operated for demonstration purposes 34
or subsequent to the sale,35 the liability of the dealer remains the same,
being based on the fact that he permits, whether by sale or in anticipation
of a sale, a defective automobile to be operated upon the public streets.36
A warranty, being an integral part of a contract and its validity depending on consideration, is made for the bexiefit and protection of the purchaser37 and an action thereon is restricted to those in privity with the
seller.38 With the action under the theory of negligence open to those not
parties to the sale it is difficult to imagine an attempted recovery by such
persons on the theory of breach of warranty. However, such attempts have
been made with the obvious result of defeat by reason of lack of privity.39
Although it has been held that the principle of implied warranty does not
apply to second hand machinery,40 the rule is abrogated when a used car
is represented as being in a safe condition and the purchase is made in
41
reliance thereon.
Truck and Tractor Inc., supra note 6, 139 P.2d 706, 714, where the court said that the
mere possession by the purchaser for twenty-five days does not necessarily break the
chain of cause and effect.
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393 (1939); Delair
v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 Atl. 181 (1936).
30. While the action based on fraud is available, still, it requires proof that the
dealer had knowledge of the defect and is therefore seldom used. Barni v. Kutner,
supra note 2.
31. Barni v. Kutner, supra note 2; Bock v. Truck and Tractor Inc., supra note 6;
Flies v. Fox Buick Co., supra note 1.
32. Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra note 1.
33. Holt v. Eastern Motor Co., supra note 6; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra
note 1; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 490 (1938).

Contra: West v. Wall, 191 Ark. 856,

88 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
34. Holt v. Eastern Motor Co., supra note 6; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v.
Leaverton, supra note 1.
35. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra note 4; Barni v. Kutner, supra note 2.
36. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra note 4; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v.
Leaverton, supra note 1.
37. Barni v. Kutner, supra note 2.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Bayer v. Winston Motor Car Co., 194 Mich. 222, 160 N.W. 642 (1916);
WILLISTON, SALES § 232 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
41. Curby v. Mastenbrook, 288 Mich. 676, 286 N.W. 123 (1939).
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"Puffing," while harmless in other situations,' 2 when applied to used
cars is a distinct representation and may be the basis for an action on the
theory of warranty.' 3 The dealer assumes the risk whenever he makes a
representation, whether 4 4 or no 5 the actual condition of the car is known
to him.
It is apparent that while the used car dealer is burdened with a duty,
it is,reasonable and relatively easy to satisfy. A reasonable examination to
detect patent defects, with particular attention given to the brakes and
steering mechanism, followed either by the making of necessary repairs or
informing the prospective purchaser of the defects will suffice to relieve
him of liability.

HARoLD L. HANSEN

42. Berwash v. Ballou, 356 Ill. 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907); Stovall v. Newell, 158
Ore. 206, 75 P.2d 346 (1938).
43. Curby v. Mastenbrook, suhra note 41; Boos v. Claude, subra note 5. Contra:
Terrill v. Florence, 53 Ga. App. 345, 185 S.E. 839 (1936) (a dealer's representation
was said to be merely a statement of opinion).
44. See note 30 sui4ra.
45. Curby v. Mastenbrook, supra note 41.

